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Abstract: We introduce the Relational Blockworld (RBW) as a paradigm for deflating
the mysteries associated with quantum non-separability/non-locality and the measure-
ment problem. We begin by describing how the relativity of simultaneity implies the
blockworld, which has an explanatory potential subsuming both dynamical and rela-
tional explanations. It is then shown how the canonical commutation relations funda-
mental to non-relativistic quantum mechanics follow from the relativity of simultaneity.
Therefore, quantum mechanics has at its disposal the full explanatory power of the
blockworld. Quantum mechanics exploits this expanded explanatory capability since
event distributions among detectors per the density matrix follow from spacetime rela-
tions (symmetry group) alone. Thus, the event distributions of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics follow from a blockworld wherein spacetime relations are fundamental. Per
RBW “quantum mysteries” are deflated and the implications for consciousness and the
perception of temporal flow and absolute becoming are explored. We conclude that given
RBW, consciousness is no less fundamental than any “physical” feature of the world such
as brain states. Further, active consciousness is needed to explain the illusion that it
is a dynamical world and consciousness in its most fundamental state is relational and
non-local.
Keywords: Quantum Non-locality – Relational Blockworld – Fortuitousness – Con-
sciousness – Absolute Becoming
1 Introduction
The Relational Blockworld (RBW) can be understood in two ways: (1) as a
framework providing computational and metaphysical structures which can
resolve most (if not all) of the tensions between non-relativistic quantum
mechanics (QM) and special relativity (SR) and (2) as providing an inter-
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pretation of QM that deflates its conceptually problematic features, such
as entanglement, non-locality, and quantum measurement. As an item of
empirical metaphysics, RBW describes a reality in which the essence of SR
(the relativity of simultaneity) and the essence of QM (non-commutivity,
non-locality and non-separability) are both true of that reality. As an item
of empirical science, RBW provides the computational formalism to model
phenomena non-dynamically in an irreducibly relational fashion. The goal
of the RBW program is to unify QM and SR in an empirically verifiable,
non-dynamical account of reality.
In order to accommodate their essential features, QM and SR cannot
both be afforded fundamental status in a unifying theory. Namely, there
cannot be both definite classical events constituting a Minkowski manifold
and physical observables that are non-commutative, non-separable and non-
locally correlated. Per RBW, we can preserve the essence of both SR and
QM if spacetime symmetries are considered fundamental, i.e., spatiotem-
poral relations are fundamental to relata. The conceptual price for this
picture of reality — a radical spatiotemporal relationalism and a radically
non-dynamical perspective — is dissonance with the way physics typically
models reality. However, RBW is empirically compatible with both SR and
QM, and affords a “middle way” out of the well-known conflict between
them. In providing a spacetime basis for both SR and QM, RBW manages
to capture the essential elements of our best spacetime theory and our best
theory of matter, but gives up (i) the fundamentality of “trans-temporal ob-
jects,” (ii) dynamical physical processes, (iii) the substance/property model
of phenomena and (iv) time as a fundamental ingredient in physical expla-
nations. Section 2 discusses in more detail how RBW resolves the tensions
between QM and SR.
According to RBW, irreducible spatiotemporal relations in a blockworld
explain physical phenomena (like the clicks in a measurement instrument,
etc.), not transtemporal objects manifesting certain properties and interact-
ing with other transtemporal objects. RBW explains by giving the geomet-
ric structure of spacetime symmetry relations — i.e., the global relational
dependence of various regions of spacetime with each other. Geometry is
fundamental in RBW; all other physical facts are manifestations, if you
will, of the geometric structure of spacetime symmetries. RBW radically
diverges from the way physics typically models reality, i.e., by presuppos-
ing trans-temporal objects, idealized as test particles with mass, under the
governance of a class of dynamical laws and kinematical principles.
Consequently, the Hilbert space of QM, while computationally essen-
Mark Stuckey, Michael Silberstein, Michael Cifone 209
tial, is replaced conceptually with geometry in RBW. Thus Hilbert-space
quantum mechanics, by which we mean the non-commutative structure of
observables, entanglement and non-locality represented in the Hilbert space
formalism, is not fundamental. Rather the geometry, uniquely determined
by the spacetime symmetries basic to RBW, is fundamental. Not only does
RBW advocate the view that spacetime geometry of Minkowski spacetime
can satisfactorily explain, and even deflate, the so-called conceptual “mys-
teries” of QM, but RBW explains how QM follows from the geometry of
a suitably chosen spacetime symmetry structure [1]. According to RBW
the Hilbert space representation of physical observables, and the whole
paradigm of state-space physics, are merely calculational tools — they are
not metaphysically fundamental. The focus of Section 3 is to show how
RBW deflates the various well known quantum mysteries.
In short, the three main tenets of RBW are: (1) the relativity of si-
multaneity (RoS) implies a BW view of reality, (2) QM is a consequence
of a spacetime structure which respects RoS, (3) QM is a manifestation of
the irreducibly relational symmetries of spacetime, and is not a dynami-
cal theory of matter in motion, i.e., nothing is “quantized;” there are no
“particles,” “waves,” etc., moving/acting in spacetime according to some
dynamical equation of motion, such as Schro¨dinger’s equation. The major-
ity of the paper, Section 4, is devoted to drawing out the consequences of
RBW for the experience of time, change and the status of consciousness.
We conclude that consciousness is as fundamental in RBW as anything
else, and that like everything else in RBW, it is fundamentally relational,
non-separable and non-local. We also show why fundamental consciousness
must be invoked in RBW to explain the persistent illusion of a dynamical
world or “moving now.” It is the dynamics of consciousness that explains
the experience/illusion of a dynamical world and not the other way round.
2 RBW Resolves Tensions Between QM and SR
2.1 The relativity of simultaneity implies BW
The property of simultaneity is defined by a spacetime foliation into space-
like hypersurfaces. A spacelike hypersurface is a plane of simultaneity,
i.e., what we refer to as “space” or “the universe” at an instant of time.
According to SR, a collection of observers A at rest with respect to one
another will foliate spacetime differently than another such collection of
observers B in motion with respect to A. Further, there is no reason to
grant preferred status to either foliation, so SR implies the relativity of
simultaneity.
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As a consequence of RoS, consider an observer Alice in A passing an
observer Bob in B. Except for one another, Alice and Bob will disagree on
who exists simultaneously with them at that instant of time (call it “to-
day”); people at rest with respect to Alice will exist simultaneously with her
“today,” while those at rest with respect to Bob will exist simultaneously
with him “today.” According to SR, the people in Bob’s plane of simul-
taneity will exist with people in Alice’s past and future, and vice-versa. So,
Bob and Alice exist together “today” and people in Bob’s “today” exist to-
gether with people in Alice’s “tomorrow” and “yesterday.” Likewise, people
in Alice’s “today” exist together with people in Bob’s “tomorrow” and “yes-
terday.” If there is no empirical means of discrimination, then both Alice
and Bob are justified in their designations of who exists with them “today,”
so their pasts and futures are as real as their presents. This interpretative
consequence of the RoS is known as the blockworld.
Per the blockworld (BW), temporal as well as spatial location must
be physically insignificant in some deep sense, and must be a matter of
one’s perspective rather than a property of the spacetime events them-
selves. The temporal and spatial locations of an event are unique to one’s
frame of reference in a more profound manner than implied by the intuitive
Galilean coordinate transformations of Newtonian physics. As a conse-
quence, conscious beings themselves, as observers in the spacetime of SR,
also lack absolute spatiotemporal locations. Conscious observers do not
carry an intrinsic “now” that is somehow mixed into the nature of their
being to single out points along their worldlines in spacetime. If a “now”
continually highlights different points along a particular worldline, then
there exists movement with respect to another temporal dimension, i.e.,
some ‘meta-time’. Meta-time invoked for the purpose of a moving “now”
is empirically inconsequential otherwise, so in the interest of parsimony it
is ignored by physics. Thus to imbue worldlines with “nowness,” without
invoking a superfluous meta-time, requires all points on all worldlines be
equally endowed, thereby rendering the concept of “nowness” useless.
In summary, RoS says different space-like foliations of the spacetime
manifold obtain and no space-like foliation is preferred, i.e., no observer-
independent physical features of the spacetime manifold can be used to
distinguish one foliation from the infinitely many other possible foliations.
BW is the straightforward extrapolation of RoS to the co-reality of the
past, future and present for all observers. Thus, the spirit of SR is the rel-
ativistic democracy afforded to all foliations of Minkowski spacetime and
any theory purporting to be empirically equivalent to SR, while adding a
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preferred frame, violates this essential spirit and is rejected by BW. In this
sense, BW accepts an unmodified SR, i.e., one true to the “principle” ver-
sion of SR developed by Einstein, as opposed to the “constructive” version
of SR Lorentz tried to develop before Einstein that presupposed a fixed
background Newtonian spacetime along with an “aether” to explain the
signature of the spacetime metric [2].
2.2 QM resides in a BW
Perhaps surprisingly, BW is germane to non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics. This follows from the work of Kaiser and Bohr & Ulfbeck who showed
the canonical commutation relations of QM follow from the relativity of
simultaneity. Kaiser writes [3],
For had we begun with Newtonian spacetime, we would have the
Galilean group instead of [the restricted Poincare´ group]. Since
Galilean boosts commute with spatial translations (time being
absolute), the brackets between the corresponding generators
vanish, hence no canonical commutation relations (CCR)! In the
[c→∞ limit of the Poincare´ algebra], the CCR are a remnant
of relativistic invariance where, due to the nonabsolute nature
of simultaneity, spatial translations do not commute with pure
Lorentz transformations.
Bohr & Ulfbeck [4] realized that the “Galilean transformation in the weakly
relativistic regime” is needed to construct a position operator for QM, and
this transformation “includes the departure from simultaneity, which is
part of relativistic invariance.” Regarding the commutator of the “weakly
relativistic boost” with a spatial translation they note, “The product of
the coordinate transformations [a ‘weakly relativistic’ boost and a spatial
translation] taken in the opposite order are seen to differ by a time dis-
placement. . . ” It is precisely this “time displacement” which is responsible
for RoS. They write [4],
“For ourselves, an important point that had for long been an ob-
stacle, was the realization that the position of a particle, which is
a basic element of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, requires
the link between space and time of relativistic invariance.”
Thus, the essence of QM — its canonical commutation relations — is the
result of RoS and QM may be regarded as residing in a BW akin to that
of Minkowski spacetime.
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2.3 From a classical to a relational blockworld
QM predicts the existence of physical observables which are non-commuta-
tive, non-separable and which can manifest non-local correlations at arbi-
trary distances. QM manifestly contradicts our ordinary classical picture
of reality, and as such isn’t obviously compatible with what might be called
the “classical” BW view provided supra. RoS is organic to QM as shown
in the preceding section, but can BW, as an interpretation of RoS, accom-
modate QM?
Many philosophers, like Huw Price [5] and Gordon Fleming (with H.
Bennett) [6], who are inclined to think about the theoretical problems be-
tween SR and QM, have proposed very novel theories which seemingly ac-
commodate QM in a BW setting. Price takes issue with the temporal bias
inherent in the common cause principle, which states that correlated exper-
imental outcomes exist because of some common event in their past light
cones and never the converse. Price proposes, rather, a time-symmetric QM
in a BW setting. For Price, the arrow of time can point from past to future
or future to past in order to explain the spacetime relationship between a
common event in the past light cones of correlated experimental outcomes
and those experimental outcomes. Unlike Price, Fleming advocates rela-
tivizing quantum mechanical properties like entanglement to hyperplanes
of simultaneity in a Minkowski setting rather than trying to devise a time-
symmetric interpretation of QM. Thus, at least in principle, Fleming’s view
preserves the spirit of BW by taking entanglement to be a relation between
a physical system and some hyperplane and then being democratic about
all the families of hyperplanes per RoS.
While perhaps only implicit in both Price and Fleming’s proposals, spa-
tiotemporal relationalism is made explicit in RBW wherein the salient geo-
metric structure of BW is used to explain, rather than merely ‘house’, QM.
By doing so, RBW makes full use of the expanded explanatory potential of
BW that is obtained via relationalism, and dynamical contrivances aren’t
required to accommodate QM phenomena. In fact, according to the re-
lationalism of RBW, spatiotemporal relations exist independently of, and
fundamental to, relata. This radical relationalism avoids the necessity of
invoking classical, pseudo-classical or even quantum mechanically “entan-
gled” entities with their own properties, changing over time, to explain
fundamental physical processes. And, while other proposals merely render
QM and SR compatible, RBW unifies them in that both emerge from the
same basic geometric structure. In these respects, RBW is quite distinct
from proposals common in the literature today that try to square QM and
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SR in a BW setting.
It is this relationalism which distinguishes RBW from BW in a classical
setting such as SR, and allows for the explanation of quantum phenom-
ena. In short, a classical BW becomes radically relational to accommodate
certain features of QM. But this move is not made merely to accommo-
date quantum phenomena in a relativistic setting — we have quantum field
theory for that. Rather, this move is made to deflate the “mysteries” of
non-relativistic quantum mechanics while maintaining harmony with SR.
And, the use of spatiotemporal relationalism is entirely justified by the
formalism of QM.
That is, Bohr, Mottelson & Ulfbeck [7] have shown the density matrix
can be obtained via the spatio-temporal symmetries of the experimental
configuration (symmetry group) rendering concepts such as the Hamilto-
nian, mass and Planck’s constant ancillary. This implies that detector
clicks are not caused by impinging particles or collapsing waves that move
through or occupy the space between the source(s) and detector(s). Bohr,
Mottelson & Ulfbeck write [7], “Indeed, atoms and particles as things are
phantasms (things imagined).” Bohr & Ulfbeck [8] call this the Theory of
Genuine Fortuitousness and write [4],
“It would appear, however, that the role of symmetry in relation
to quantal physics has, so to speak, been turned upside down,
and it is the purpose of the present article to show that quantal
physics itself emerges when the coordinate transformations (the
elements of spacetime symmetry) are recognized as the basic
variables.”
Now according to BW, as explained supra, RoS implies all spacetime
events are equally real, whether they be labeled past, present or future
relative to some observer. The reality of all events is “hidden” from be-
ings “inside” the block, because they are relegated to a single perspective.
The sense in which the totality of facts is hidden from the view of any one
perspective in the BW gives rise to a “need,” so to speak, for constructing
dynamical explanations of, say, quantum phenomena. But in the block,
“change” or “time” isn’t a fundamental ingredient in the ultimate expla-
nation of reality since nothing changes in a BW. By building upon BW,
RBW employs a non-dynamical perspective, and dynamical explanations
such as “genuine fortuitousness” are not necessary at the fundamental level
of reality.
With this result, we have the physical motivation to reject the view
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that there are objects with intrinsic properties, or that there need be relata
standing in the relations at the fundamental level of reality when explaining
physical phenomena. Irreducible symmetry relations are all that exist at
the fundamental level of reality. Consequently, RBW is radically relational
and non-dynamical.
In conclusion, we understand that both the facts of SR and the facts of
QM are facts about the same thing — spatiotemporal symmetries under-
stood to be irreducible relations in a BW. This motivates RBW and reveals
a deep unity between SR and QM. Consequently, in RBW we do not find
a fundamental tension between SR and QM.
3 RBW Deflates “Quantum Mysteries”
RBW is a blockworld in which spatiotemporal relations are fundamental.
A blockworld is a spacetime in which the future, past and present are
equally real. Thus, presentism does not obtain in a BW and there is no
uniquely “evolving universe” or “unfolding now.” Every event that will
happen or has happened just ‘is’ in a BW. In this sense, nothing about
a BW can change, so the collapse (qua dynamical process) of the wave
function must be a fundamentally epistemological fact about the state-space
formalism that does not directly capture the ontological facts of a relational
blockworld. That is, the wave-function qua state-space representation of
QM is a calculational device, whereas the relational spacetime symmetries
of an experimental arrangement, that give rise to quantum statistics, is the
deeper ontological story of QM. Geometry is fundamental to Hilbert space,
to use a slogan. Thus, BW eliminates the measurement problem trivially.
Quantum non-locality and non-separability are likewise handled triv-
ially since RBW assumes spatiotemporal relations are fundamental in a
BW. Correlations between space-like separated events that violate Bell’s
inequalities are of no concern as long as spatiotemporal relations in the ex-
perimental apparatus warrant the correlations. There is no need to satisfy
the common cause principle, since non-local correlations are not about “par-
ticles” impinging on measuring devices. Rather, the non-local correlations
derive from the spatiotemporal relations in the construct of the experiment.
There are no influences, causal mechanisms, etc., because non-locality is a
relational property that is precisely described by the spatial translations,
rotations and reflections of any given experimental arrangement. Nothing
happens in a relational blockworld, so there is nothing for such inherently
dynamical processes and entities to do. One can invoke dynamical stories
to account for quantum non-locality, but these stories will invariably be
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“error theories” in the sense that these dynamical stories do not express
the deeper facts fundamental to a relational blockworld.
The conceptual trouble with quantum non-locality, quantum non-sepa-
rability or entanglement is a consequence of our seemingly dynamical per-
spective ‘within’ a relational blockworld. The trouble is with us, not the
world, so to speak. In trying to explain the spatiotemporal distribution of
detector clicks as caused by or as determined by impinging particles (car-
rying with them their own properties), the standard account of QM in a
spacetime setting assumes a Galilean background spacetime in which quan-
tum states evolve. Since simultaneity is (in principle) absolute in Galilean
spacetime, dynamical accounts of QM seem natural. If one is worried,
though, about the tensions between QM and SR, then not all dynamical
explanations will be so “natural.” If SR is true and reality is like a block-
world, then quantum non-locality, non-separability, etc. better not violate
RoS. Thus, nothing we say about quantum non-locality ought to allow us to
send superluminal signals, for example. As well, if reality is like a BW, then
nothing happens in the sense that nothing new “comes into being.” Pre-
and post-measurement facts are “already there” and don’t come to be after
a measurement “interaction.” There is nothing ontologically unique about
measurement events — they don’t “change” anything. We can’t think that
a particle, in interaction with a measurement device, brings some fact into
existence that wasn’t already true. Particles don’t “go” anywhere and don’t
“interact” with anything. Nothing “happens:” the past, present and future
are equally real. Non-dynamical explanations must at least respect the
reality of all spatiotemporal events.
RBW goes beyond mere non-dynamism when it comes to explaining
quantum phenomena: QM is a manifestation of the geometry of spacetime
symmetries where simultaneity is relative. Thus, RBW does not assume
that QM is independent of Minkowski spacetime — rather QM is deriva-
tive from the (reduced) spacetime symmetries of Minkowski spacetime itself.
Quantum facts are facts about the irreducible spatiotemporal relations of
a given physical system, not facts about the behavior of particles, or the
interactions of measurement devices and wave-functions, etc. There is no
“collapse of the wave function” because there are no real quantum states —
just “states” (if you will) of the entire spacetime configuration of a physical
system fixed at once. Dynamical talk is simply a crude way of trying to de-
scribe global, static, spatiotemporal dependency relations between various
regions of spacetime in a given experimental situation.
According to RBW, reality is fundamentally relational and non-dynam-
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ical, but representable dynamically. From the point of view of RBW, then,
novel quantum phenomena such as non-separability are conceptually prob-
lematic only in the attempt to formulate a dynamical explanation for some-
thing that is irreducibly relational and non-dynamical. In fact, all phe-
nomena are “non-separable” via the spatiotemporal holism of RBW. All of
which has profound implications for the way we think about phenomenal
consciousness and the way we explain our experiences of absolute change
and temporal becoming.
4 Implications of RBW for the Experience of Time, Change and
the Status of Consciousness
Given that in RBW temporal flow and absolute becoming are not external
features of the world in their own right, there is no special “Now” moving
from past to present, time does not flow or “go by,” etc., then we must
explain the experience of these things without recourse to these things as
actual features of the world. That is, we must provide an explanation
for the experience of absolute becoming and temporal flow in a relational
blockworld in which presentism is false. What follows is just a short list
of the phenomenological features of temporal experience (the various “psy-
chological arrows of time”) that must be explained in order to explain our
experience of time and change (see Dainton [9] for a more detailed discus-
sion):
1) Why, at any given moment, is our conscious awareness confined to such
a small part of spacetime that we dub “the now?”
2) What gives some experiences, by definition those that feel real to us
at any given moment, their feeling of presentness? Why do we experience
some pains as memories and others as having the property of “nowness” or
presentness?
3) Why are feelings of presentness and “realness” so inextricably connected?
What explains the feeling that to be real is to be present, after all even mem-
ories only feel real when dragged into the present and conscious attention
is focused upon them. It seems to be a transcendental truth that what
separates real experience from, say, mere memories is “being appeared to
presently.”
4) What explains the experience that things change and that the experi-
enced present is continually advancing into the future? Why do we feel
that our lives unfold in the direction of the future-that time has a direc-
tion? For example, we can always tell whether a film is being run forward
or backward, why is that? If time started going backwards globally, after a
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while, no doubt we would again feel that our lives were unfolding into the
future.
5) The experience of the “phenomenal flow” of time, we experience time as
passing even when there are no detectable changes in our environment.
6) The temporal coherence of our stream of consciousness or succession of
experiences such that each phase seems “phenomenally bonded” to its im-
mediate predecessor and successor.
7) Why do we have detailed knowledge of (or greater epistemic access to)
the “past” but not the “future”?
8) Why do we have such an asymmetry regarding attitudes, feelings, expla-
nations and decision making about the “future” if “past” events are equally
real? Why, for example, do I fear future pains but not past ones? Why do
we generally explain later events (such as dying) with reference to earlier
events (such as getting shot) and not the other way around?
9) What explains the phenomenology of the “specious present” — that
experience comes in packets of meaningful duration (think of a melody
or reading passages) say as opposed to durationless instants or spacetime
points?
There are only so many logical possibilities open to us when it comes
to explaining (or not) our experience of time and change:
1) Various asymmetries or features of internal mental (or neural) processes.
2) Various asymmetries or features of the external world.
3) Various asymmetries or features of both internal mental processes and
the external world.
4) Neither internal mental processes nor the external world has the resources
to explain our experience.
Of course there is no reason to believe that all of the preceding psy-
chological arrows of time will be explained in exactly the same way. For
example, the experienced asymmetry between past and future or the expe-
rience of change might be explained by asymmetries in the external world
such as the thermodynamic arrow of time plus memory and the experience
that irrespective of change time is always “flowing” might be explained by
other mechanisms either in the world and/or in the brain.
That said there are a couple of misnomers here that need to be dis-
pelled in order to make progress. First, that if the blockworld is true and
contrary to presentism we do not directly apprehend the “moving now” or
global metaphysical present, then we can only appeal to (1) above when it
comes to explaining our experience of time and change, and thus explaining
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the experience of temporal flow and absolute change is much harder given
blockworld. Second, that if presentism is true we can appeal to both men-
tal processes and real asymmetries in the external world and therefore our
experience of temporal flow and absolute becoming are no great mystery.
These claims are misnomers because (i) many external asymmetries
(such as causal patterns) still exist even in a blockworld and can be called
on by all to help explain experience, (ii) it is not clear how we would
perceive a “moving now” even if it did exist and (iii) explaining the vari-
ous psychological arrows of time turns out to be quite hard regardless of
whether blockworld or presentism is true. As for (i) the following is a non-
exhaustive list of external asymmetries that anyone, regardless of whether
blockworld or presentism, is true, can appeal to in order to try and explain
our experience of time and change (see Dainton [9] for a more detailed
discussion):
1) Entropic asymmetry: the second law of thermodynamics states that
entropy increases over time.
2) Causal asymmetry: some events are regarded as causes of other events
and causes generally precede their effects.
3) Fork asymmetry: we often find later events that are correlated or caused
by a single earlier event, for example everyone exposed to radiation gets
sick at a later time. The inverse fork is much rarer.
As for (ii) while our perceptions appear to immediately inform us about
the order and duration of events, we cannot apply any of the usual models
of perception to explain this fact. The problem is that order, duration and
other temporal “features” unlike, say, shape and color, are not “objects”
or “properties” of perceptual states in any standard sense. To perceive the
order and duration of events we have to be aware of the events themselves,
whereas with color and shape we can focus on those features to the exclusion
of other features of an event or entity. The point is that order, duration,
the “moving now,” etc., do not appear to be external features of events in
the way that shape and color are, and therefore it is hard to explain our
experience of them by appeal to the causal theory of perceptual knowledge
as we do with say color experiences. Whereas we have identified areas
of the brain responsible for perceiving and representing color and shape
related physical phenomena, it is not clear that there is any part of the
brain devoted to perceiving and representing an externally given “moving
now.” This leads some people to believe that the experience of the “moving
now” is a projection of mind or brain rather than a perception, perhaps
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even a transcendental ground of experience as Kant would have it.
The point of (iii) is that regardless of blockworld or presentism, it is
not yet clear to us what external and/or internal features account for our
experience of temporal flow and absolute becoming. This much is clear,
both blockworld and presentism can (and often do) appeal to many of the
same external and internal features in order to explain our experience of
time and change, and neither view has produced an answer leading to a
scientific consensus — it is still a mystery. While blockworld, unlike pre-
sentism, cannot appeal to a special “moving now,” the truth of presentism,
etc., in order to explain the various psychological arrows of time, it is far
from clear what extra explanatory mileage presentism gains from such an
appeal. And again, the blockworld can also appeal to such external asym-
metries as the causal (light-cone) structure given by Minkowski spacetime,
the “radiative” asymmetry, the entropic asymmetry, etc. Blockworld can
acknowledge that these and other external features of the world often con-
tribute to the illusion of a “moving now” and absolute becoming. But
as we shall see, such external features of the world are at best necessary
conditions for our experience of time and change.
Indeed, just as there is an “explanatory gap” (and perhaps an onto-
logical one) between brain processes and “phenomenal consciousness,” so
there is an explanatory gap between on the one hand time and change as
conceived in the physics of blockworld and on the other the experience of
temporal flow and absolute becoming. In fact the problem of explaining
our conscious experience of time and change is in part a subset of the “hard
problem of consciousness.” Some might even argue that the experience of
“nowness” slipping into the future is the very essence of phenomenal con-
sciousness. And as we shall see, the hard problem becomes much harder in
a blockworld and it takes on a certain ineluctable shape.
However, that said, even in a world dynamically conceived such as pre-
sentism there is a huge disconnect between the “flow” of physical processes
(the external “arrows of time”) and the subjective experience of temporal
becoming. That is, there is no obvious isomorphism between physical pro-
cesses and temporal experience (though some neuroscientists may hope to
find some in the brain). In addition to showing us the disconnect on the
one hand between time and change as experienced and the various external
or physical arrows of time on the other, the following well-known examples
also illustrate the necessity of normal brain function in “producing” our
ordinary experience of temporal flow and absolute becoming:
The 0.5 second time lag in perception, the experienced present is actu-
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ally of the recent past as there is a typical time-lag between initial stimu-
lation and experience of 0.5 seconds. Obviously we are not aware of this
time-lag. The more complicated an incoming stimulus, the longer it takes
the brain to process.
Coherent and complex perceptual experiences involving multiple sen-
sory modalities are formed from sensory stimuli that travel at different
speeds, such as the speed of light, sound, smell, etc. Therefore each kind of
sensory data that will ultimately form a particular coherent experience for
the observer arrives at the brain for processing at different times. Further-
more, all of these different sensory signals are processed in different parts
of the brain. The visual stimuli alone such as that pertaining to motion,
color, distance, size, and “higher-level” processes such as facial recognition
all get processed in different parts of the brain. But we do not, for example,
experience the visual elements of an event before the auditory features even
though light travels faster than sound. So how is it that people (with nor-
mal brains at least) experience perfectly synchronized and coherent events
or conscious perceptions? The complete answer to this “binding problem”
is unknown, but we do know that it involves the brain constantly “back-
dating,” rearranging or reversing conscious perception in time. The brain
backdates conscious perceptions to the time when the stimulus first entered
the brain. Consciousness of events are backdated so that awareness seems
to arise at the same time as the events actually take place. Part of this is
explained by different processing times in the brain, for example, auditory
signals are processed more quickly than visual ones.
However a differential in processing times for different stimuli is not the
whole story. For example, Libet [10] discovered that if we directly stim-
ulate the appropriate spot on the somatosensory cortex that is connected
to the hand and then 150 milliseconds later we stimulate the hand itself,
the subject reports the hand stimulus as coming first. This is very puz-
zling because the “real external” time to process both signals is the same.
Somehow the brain flipped the order of events in conscious experience.
Another good example of the constructed nature of time perception is
the brain mechanism of saccadic suppression. Why, given how rapid eye
movements are, do we not feel motion induced nausea and experience the
world as blurred? Part of the answer is saccadic suppression. This is a brain
mechanism that interferes with vision during eye movements and blinks.
Vision is at least in part shut down when your eye is in transition and thus
we suffer neither nausea nor jerky images. The amount of time during the
day in which vision is shut down is not trivial, “adding up all the little
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snippets of the running movie that constitutes daily life that are ‘lost’ due
to saccadic and blink suppression amounts to a staggering 60 to 90 minutes
each day,” Koch [11]. Why then do we not experience blank periods in our
visual awareness everyday? Most neuroscientists believe that there must
be some “trans-saccadic integration” brain mechanism that “fills in these
intervals with a ‘fictive’ movie, a composite of the image just before and
just after the saccade,” Koch [11].
If perception of temporal flow, the order of events, duration and other
time-related features of experience are constructed and active projections
of cognition, then intersubjective agreement under normal conditions plus
individual local “nows” might help create the illusion of a shared “moving
now” and absolute becoming “out there” in the external world. Of course
there are many external contingencies that contribute to this intersubjec-
tive agreement such as the fact that the time scale of perception is short
compared to the time scales upon which key features of the macroscopic
environment change or vary, individuals are moving relative to one another
at velocities small compared to c, the light travel time between individuals
in an inertial frame in which they are nearly at rest is small compared to
the time scales of perception, etc.
However normal internal or cognitive conditions are also necessary for
ordinary time perception and they do not always obtain. We now have
good evidence that there are one or more “clocks” in the brain. One such
brain clock is a loop of dopamine-generated neural activity which flows
between the substantia nigra in the base of the brain (where dopamine is
produced), the basal ganglia, and the prefrontal cortex. Each “tick” of this
clock is the same time it takes for the nerve signals to complete the loop.
All neural events that occur within that time are experienced as a single
moment. The average tick is about one-tenth of a second, but they do vary
considerably. Many external events may occur within a particular cycle
or tick of the brain clock, such as the flapping of an insect’s wings, but
they will be perceived as one event. If two flashes of light are presented to
someone with less than a one-tenth of a second gap between them, they will
be perceived as one flash only. If the two flashes are far enough apart so as
to be in separate cycles or ticks of the brain clock, they will be perceived
as such.
As a result of this data and more, some neuroscientists such as Koch [11]
now believe that all perception, rather than being continuous, is actually
discrete: “perception might well take place in discrete processing epochs,
perceptual moments, frames, or snapshots. Your subjective life could be a
222 Relational Blockworld
ceaseless sequence of such frames.” The suggestion here is that relative to
each such snapshot the perception of sensory qualities such as color, depth
and even motion would be constant. On this view motion is experienced
not because of a change in position between two consecutive snapshots such
as happens with film, but because motion is represented within a single
snapshot by somehow being suggestive of movement. Imagine for example
a still photograph of someone in a running posture. It is hypothesized
that if conscious perception does take place in discrete moments that the
perception of the passage of time might in part be a function of the rate
at which snapshots occur. For example, the kind of “protracted duration”
or slowing down of the passage of time experienced during accidents might
result from more snapshots occurring per unit time and thus the same
one-second interval will now be divided into more snapshots than normal
resulting in the feeling that time is passing much more slowly. There is a
rare alteration in time perception that sometimes happens to people with
severe visual migraine dubbed “cinematographic vision” by Oliver Sacks
(Koch [11]). When this occurs, time is experienced as discontinuous like a
succession of stills with nothing in between in which the illusion of motion
has been lost. Koch [11] hypothesizes that in such cases “the migraine may
have temporarily inactivated the cortical motion areas,” thus providing
some first-person evidentiary support for the discrete theory of perception.
There are several well-known examples in which, due to brain damage,
illness, trauma, shock, etc., the timing mechanisms in our brain are dis-
rupted and produce radically altered states of consciousness. People with
Parkinson’s disease, in which the neurotransmitter dopamine is depleted,
experience the passage of time differently. If you ask the average person
to say “now” after they think a minute has passed, they will do so after
about 40 seconds. The person with Parkinson’s however will on average
say “now” after about 60 seconds has passed. In one well-known case a
66-year old man found that he could not drive or watch TV because the
cars and TV images seemed to be on “fast forward” and were zooming by
him. When the “minute-test” was applied to him, he didn’t say “now”
until five minutes had passed. It was later discovered that the man had a
growth in his prefrontal cortex. Catatonic patients who recover sometimes
report their experience while catatonic as being like “stuck on pause,” their
memories of that time period suggest that time did not pass for them and
there was no change in conscious states, though they were aware. We have
all experienced alterations in our experience of temporal flow and duration
during fever, accidents, etc.
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The normal function of memory and its relationship to perception is
also an important condition for our experience of the passage of time. One
major reason we “sense” time passing is that our perceptions and memories
combine in a particular sort of way over our entire life. At each moment
of conscious awareness I have memories of previous moments from a few
seconds back to many years back. This contributes significantly to the il-
lusion that time passes, that absolute change occurs and it helps explain
why I have the belief that time is really dynamically unfolding. When this
memory mechanism is disrupted it causes extreme alterations in percep-
tions of time. For example, patients with Korsakoff syndrome cannot make
new long term memories beyond those they had at the time of their brain
damage and whatever enters their short term memory is forgotten in a cou-
ple of minutes or less. Such people do not experience time as passing as
we do and in some extreme cases they do not believe they are aging until
forced to view themselves in a mirror; they are horrified of course, but not
for very long as they cannot retain the memory of what they saw. One
very extreme example of amnesia is the case of Clive Wearing, “a gifted
musician and scholar, he suffered a viral brain infection that almost killed
him and destroyed parts of both temporal lobes. Clive consciously experi-
ences only the present. He has no childhood, no past,” (Koch [11]). Having
different memories at different stages in our lives helps explain the illusion
that times passes. The right kind of patterns of memory accumulation is
an important part of the story about our sense that time passes.
Regardless of whether asymmetries of both internal mental processes
and the external world are necessary to explain the illusion that time passes,
there is no denying that our experience of the world and our introspective
processes reveal a universe that has very ordered and unique patterns of
organization that bespeak of unfolding dynamical processes along the tem-
poral axis. After all, there would be no past, present and future at all if
spacetime did not have timelike directions. There would be no approximate
intersubjective “now” if we did not exist on timelike worldlines, but rather
existed on spacelike worldlines. Of course the internal and external asym-
metries are not completely orthogonal. No doubt there are features of the
very same laws of physics that give rise to the external asymmetries that
are also necessary for the very existence and functioning of the brain-mind.
The point is this, the distribution of events as experienced by us over
the course of our lives and the various asymmetrical patterns in the world
as seen from our perspective could all exist even in a blockworld. We have
seen that even holding all external features of the world constant, people’s
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temporal experience can be radically altered. We have seen that our expe-
rience of temporal flow and change is largely a cognitive construction, all
of which raises doubts that anything like real dynamical processes in the
external world are either necessary or sufficient to explain our experiences.
We have every reason to doubt that our experiences of time’s passage and
change are best explained by an objective global metaphysical property
such as a “moving now.”
So far so good, most of this is well-know to advocates of blockworld
and most, therefore, are not too concerned by the argument from temporal
experience against the static worldview. However there is a rub that no
“blockworlder” that we are aware of has ever considered. We have learned
that in order to explain our experience of time and change we are going
to have to, at least in part, appeal to conscious brain processes whether
it is a blockworld or not. Natural science such as cognitive neuroscience
wants to explain the very existence of phenomenal conscious experience
(such as the experience of a special “moving now”), by appealing to dy-
namical brain processes. This is evident just from the brain mechanisms
alluded to in this paper, such as the mechanism of “temporal binding” that
makes coherent experience possible, the brain’s clock that produces the dis-
crete frames of perception, the “processing time” of all sensory modalities,
the saccadic suppression mechanism, etc. All these mechanisms and all the
models of brain mechanisms in general are essentially dynamical in nature.
In neuroscience, in every case such as cognition, perception, memory, etc.,
the attempted explanation of these functions appeals to the dynamics of
cell assemblies, neuronal firing rates, etc. Explanation of specific conscious
states and specific cognitive functions in cognitive neuroscience is always
in terms of “underlying causal mechanisms” in the brain or the “neural
correlate of consciousness or cognition,” both of which are inherently di-
achronic and dynamic conceptions of explanation. Thus, the fundamental
working assumption of cognitive neuroscience and much of philosophy of
mind is that matter in general and brain processes in particular are more
fundamental than consciousness, both ontologically and explanatorily.
So what’s the rub? In the blockworld there is no absolute motion or
change, no dynamical processes actually exist. The block universe ‘is’, ‘was’
and ‘always will be’ as it ‘is’. As Dainton [9] puts it: “Imagine that I am a
God-like being who had decided to design and then create a logically consis-
tent. . . block universe. Since the universe will be of the block-variety I will
have to create it as a whole: the ‘beginning’, ‘middle’ and ‘end’ will come
into being together. Well, assuming that our universe is a static block, even
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if it never ‘came into being’, it nonetheless exists (timelessly) as a coherent
whole, containing a globally consistent spread of events.” In a blockworld
in which all events are equally real, any explanations proffered for any
event (including those pertaining to conscious brain processes) that appeal
to causal mechanisms/processes, non-linear dynamics, or more generally
“becoming,” “change,” etc., must be error theories or merely compatibilist
accounts of such processes. Certainly, as blockworlders have done since
the beginning, we can cook up compatibilist versions of change, causation,
becoming, etc., either by relativizing such notions to a frame of reference
or by picking out certain invariant features in Minkowski spacetime, such
as the light-cone structure, upon which to define these notions. But none
of this changes the fact that all events in a blockworld are equally real
and thus any talk about change, causation, becoming, etc., must be purely
perspectival. All of which implies that brain “processes” do not literally
cause (as in bring about or give rise to something that did not exist before)
conscious “processes” and conscious processes are every bit as fundamental
as brain processes. There is no absolute sense in which the better part of
the universe’s history unfolded without phenomenal consciousness and then
conscious processes sprang into being and then became more sophisticated
over time as the result of dynamically evolving brain processes.
Thus we find ourselves in the following dilemma: either explain phenom-
enal consciousness (or the illusion of such) by appealing to dynamical brain
processes as we do in cognitive neuroscience, or explain the illusion of a dy-
namical world that appears to have temporal flow, change and becoming by
appealing to the machinations of phenomenal conscious processes. At least
when it comes to deciding which kind of explanation is more fundamental,
we must choose one or the other option above — we cannot have both.
Given blockworld, there is no absolute change, becoming, causation, etc,
and therefore we must appeal to conscious experience (at least in part) to
explain this illusion. And, given blockworld, we cannot a la cognitive neu-
roscience discharge consciousness as less fundamental or less explanatory
than brain processes themselves. None of this suggests Cartesian dualism,
but it does tell against physicalism as realistically conceived and it does
speak for a kind of nondual or dual-aspect account of the relationship be-
tween mind and matter, as they are but two aspects or modes of a nondual
blockworld. It is clear from all this that even in a classical blockworld (as
opposed to RBW) there is an obvious sense in which the blockworld qua
blockworld is a fundamental singular entity rather than something that can
be decomposed or partitioned into discrete and autonomous parts in any
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absolute sense.
Anybody with standard dynamical physicalist intuitions about phenom-
enal consciousness should be asking themselves this question: forget about
explaining the character of our experience such as temporal becoming and
change, how can there be “beings” with conscious experiences at all in
a static blockworld if nothing happens and all events and their various
features (such as conscious states) are equally real? How can we explain
phenomenal consciousness in a world in which evolutionary theory, molec-
ular biology, cognitive neuroscience, etc., are merely heuristic devices in
a static world? Assuming that conscious states are no exception to the
block-nature of the world, what can a blockworlder say except “that’s just
the way this blockworld is, it’s a brute fact that conscious beings exist and
that particular conscious states bear whatever static correlations they do
with particular brain states.” If the physicalist finds this answer profoundly
disturbing, then they have an internal conflict between our best physics and
what they take to be our best explanations of consciousness and cognition
from cognitive neuroscience.
There is one well-known physicist who tacitly at least acknowledges the
inescapable brute nature of conscious states and their correlations with
brain states in a static world, but nonetheless still tries to tell a story
whereby brain states somehow determine, explain or are identical to con-
scious states. We have in mind Julian Barbour [12] who advocates what is
arguably an even more radically static conception of the universe than our
own RBW (see Barbour [12] for details). Barbour’s interpretation of the
Wheeler-Dewitt equation is that the universe is an N -dimensional configu-
ration space wherein each point is a static three-space with one of infinitely
many possible static configurations of matter-energy embedded in it. There
is no temporal axis in Barbour’s world. Barbour calls each of these points
in configuration space a “Now.” Each “Now” will of course have its con-
scious observers such that “any human experience is determined by that
human’s neurological state at a particular Now. A person will have different
experiences at different Nows. Some of these will include representations
of others, integrated in such a way as to be experienced as having hap-
pened earlier. Others will be integrated in such a way as to be experienced
as perceived motion,” (Healey [13]). In spite of his radically timeless uni-
verse, Barbour [12] says things that make him sound like a crude kind of
mind/brain identity theorist when explaining, for example, the experience
or illusion of motion:
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Could all motion be a similar deception? Suppose we could
freeze the atoms in our brains at some instant. We might be
watching gymnastics. What would brain specialists find in the
frozen pattern of the atoms? They will surely find that the
pattern encodes the positions of the gymnasts at that instant.
But it may also encode the positions of gymnasts at preceding
instants. . . The brain in any instant always contains, as it were,
several stills of a movie. They correspond to different positions
of objects we think we see moving. The idea is that it is this
collection of ‘stills’, all present in any one instant, that stands
in psychophysical parallel with the motion we actually see. The
brain ‘plays the movie for us’, rather as an orchestra plays the
notes on the score. . . If we could preserve one of these brain
patterns in aspic, it would be perpetually conscious of seeing
the gymnasts in motion.
Barbour must realize of course that given his claim that “Nows” are fun-
damental elements of reality, then brain states are no more fundamental
than or explanatory than conscious states. Brain states do not exist prior
in time to conscious states, nor do they “give rise to them” or cause them.
Barbour’s insinuation that brain states explain by merely “coding for” or
being “isomorphic to” the conscious state they correlate with would be
considered crude neuroscience even in a dynamical world. But the claim
is even less well-motivated in his timeless world in which there is at best a
brute correlation between a particular conscious state and a particular brain
state; there is really nothing more to say about such correlations in such a
world. In his more cautious moments Barbour [12] appreciates that at best
his view can support a kind of naturalized psychophysical parallelism:
Nothing in the material world gives us any clue as to how parts
of it (our brains) become conscious. However, there is increasing
evidence that certain mental states and activities are correlated
with certain physical states in different specific regions of the
brain. This makes it natural to assume, as was done long ago,
that there is psychophysical parallelism: conscious states some-
how reflect physical states in the brain. Put in its crudest form,
a brain scientist who knew the state of our brain would know
our conscious state at that instant. The brain state allows us to
reconstruct the conscious state, just as musical notes on paper
can be transformed by an orchestra into music we can hear.
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However, even in the preceding passage embracing psychophysical paral-
lelism, Barbour cannot resist making the additional claim that particular
brain states code for particular conscious states such that in principle a
super-duper neuroscience could read off the latter from the former. But
again, in Barbour’s timeless world the correlation or parallelism between
particular brain states and particular conscious states is just a static brute
fact, neither kind of state “explains” the other in any way. If neuroscience
really could read off conscious states from brain states in Barbour’s timeless
world, that would just mean that we discovered that, in a purely a poste-
riori fashion, it just so happens that certain conscious states are always
correlated with certain brain states, say across all “Nows.”
The point of all this, and what Barbour does not fully appreciate, is
that whether it be his timeless universe or the blockworld, the best one
can say about the relationship between a particular conscious state and a
particular brain is that they are correlated or if you prefer, “parallel” to one
another. And of course there is no reason to believe that the correlations
between conscious states and brain states are one-to-one. But, at least
in Barbour’s timeless world or the classical blockworld, the neuroscientist
can take comfort in the fact that these static correlations exist between an
individual’s particular conscious states and particular brain states. This
means that discovering the various static neural correlates of any given
conscious state is as far as neuroscience can go in explaining such states in
a blockworld.
Everything we have said so far about consciousness and the mind/body
problem applies to a classical blockworld, but you will recall that we are
defending a relational blockworld. In the relational blockworld things are
even worse for physicalism and its standard dynamical conception of ex-
planation regarding the mind and brain. As we have seen, in a classical
blockworld it is still true that an individual’s conscious states though not
“determined by” their brain states, are at least correlated with those brain
states. In the classical blockworld an individual’s conscious brain states
constitute a unified trans-temporal object that is local and separable with
respect to the rest of the world. Even though a classical blockworld must be
taken as a whole that is “open” to many different foliations, it is nonetheless
also decomposable into individual events including conscious brain events.
But recall that in RBW there are no fundamental events, trans-temporal
objects, things, etc. In RBW all phenomena are non-separable and non-
local via the spatiotemporal holism of RBW, and that includes conscious
brain processes. Unlike classical blockworld, in RBW one cannot even ap-
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proximate the idea of the neural correlates of consciousness because such an
explanatory schema presupposes that an individual’s conscious brain states
are separable and local with respect to the rest of the world, both of which
will fail to obtain in RBW. In RBW not only do an individual’s conscious
states not “supervene” upon (are not determined by) their brain states,
but they are irreducibly relational, non-local and non-separable in nature.
In RBW brains are, after all, nothing but “emergent” phenomena from
spacetime symmetries, they do not constitute autonomous systems any-
more than measuring devices do in QM experimental set-ups. One must
remember that RBW itself is not composed of anything, it is the one and
only fundamental “entity” that there is, and it is not a thing, process or
system.
All of this suggests that consciousness, like everything else in RBW,
must also be irreducibly relational, non-local and non-separable. However
there is no reason to believe that fundamental spacetime symmetries can
account for conscious experience. This leads us to hypothesize that con-
sciousness (“pure being”), which we believe in its most fundamental rep-
resentation is responsible for, or identical with, the feeling of “nowness”
or “presentness” that gives such experiences the “stamp of reality,” should
be modeled or represented via some other symmetry group. Like funda-
mental spacetime symmetries, fundamental “consciousness symmetries” are
relational and non-local, and thus have no counterpart in the brain. Fun-
damental consciousness symmetries are no more a thing, object or process
than spacetime symmetries are. Pursuing this analogy perhaps we could
say that fundamental consciousness symmetries underlie individual con-
scious perspectives, perceptions, memories, and other such denumerable
phenomenal states, in the same way that spacetime symmetries underlie
the world of “dynamical” processes, physical events, and trans-temporal
objects such as measuring devices, detectors and individual brain states.
In RBW it is the relational blockworld (spacetime symmetries), plus
pure being (consciousness symmetries), plus some initial and boundary con-
dition (a frame of reference or experimental configuration for example) that
makes for individual experiential perspectives. Compare this with physical-
ism wherein the appropriate intrinsic, local and separable brain states, plus
the appropriate distinct and local environmental context explain the exis-
tence of conscious “beings.” In RBW, to be an individual is to be or occupy
a conscious perspective in the relational blockworld. Individual existence is
nothing more than the illusion of separateness. The relational blockworld
is a seamless, nondual whole, individual existence is just the partitioning
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of the whole by the active mind. Thus, temporal becoming, the dynamical
brain and the external world are all “in the Mind.”
From the highest point of view the world has no cause. Once
you create for yourself a world in time and space, governed
by causality, you are bound to search for and find causes for
everything. You put the question and impose an answer. Each
moment contains the whole of the past and creates the whole
of the future. In reality all is here and now and all is one.
Multiplicity and diversity are in the mind. Everything is caused
by all and affects all. The diversity is in you only. See yourself
as you are and you will see the world as it is — a single block
of reality, indivisible, indescribable. Your own creative power
projects upon it a picture and all your questions refer to the
picture. (Sri Nisargadatta Maharaj [14])
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